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Quite recently a substantial number of articles have been written on 
the subject of the legality or illegality of using nuclear weapons under 
international law Certainly the m a m  impetus to this expanding body 
of literature has been the cavalier nuclear war-fighting rhetoric 
propounded by the Reagan administration since its ascent to power m  the 
aftermath of the 1980 election 2 Understandably, therefore, many of 
these articles have taken the counteractive position that the use of 
nuclear weapons is completely prohibited by international law, and 
consequently, that there exist serious legal problems related even to the 
threat to use nuclear weapons under a variety of circumstances 3 In 
other words, these writings have either directly or indirectly called into 
question the very legitimacy of America's nuclear weapons deterrence 
policy, though few if any of these articles have ventured into a 
systematic examination of the so-called ’paradox of deterrence from an 
international law perspective
Namely, if article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter orohibits both 
the threat and use of force except m  cases of legitimate self-defense 
under article 51, and if it is also clear that the actual use or nuclear 
weapons would grossly violate the international laws of humanitarian armed 
conflict under most conceivable circumstances, how can the United States 
government nevertheless lawfully threaten to use nuclear weapons m  
accordance with any theory or nuclear deterrence without violating 
international law7 Furthermore, if the Nuremberg Principles absolutely 
proscribe crimes against oeace, crjnes against humanity anc war crimes,A 
how can the United States government nevertheless lawtuliy estaDxisn a 
threat to commit sucn heinous otfenses as the ver/ basis of its theorv for 
nuclear deterrence7 Finally, does not the very articulation of these
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extremely serious reservations about the overall legality of II S nuclear 
deterrence policy weaken the credibility of the deterrent itself and 
therefore render the risks of war with the Soviet Union at least somewhat 
more probable than would be the case with the present resounding 
affirmation of the essential legitimacy of the U S nuclear deterrent 
under international law7
Critique of the "Positivist* Approach to Analyzing the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons
Most of the literature takes what the author will call a "positivist* 
approach to analyzing the question of the legality or illegality of 
nuclear weapons Namely, the threat or use of ’nuclear weapons is said 
to be either "legal" or "illegal * Yet international life and historical 
f^ct are rarely so clearcut, so susceptible to such dogmatic assertions 
and the automatic derivation of foreign policy recommendations therefrom 
According to this ’positivist" approach, no attempt is made to break down 
the concept of nuclear weapons" into its constituent elements m  
particular, what the weapons are, how they function, what their 
destructive capabilities are, what are the actual contingency plans for 
their targeting and use, and under what particular circumstances If any 
orogress is to be made concerning the debate over the legality or 
illegality of nuclear deterrence, the author submits that *uch 
discriminations must be made from an international law oerspect./e and 
□laced within their factual context It is fine ror a legal ?os*c.vist to 
declare that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal unaer all 
circumstances But how useful is such a declaration to a government
decision-maker actually dealing with issues related to the threat of using 
nuclear weapons m  tune of peace, m  tune of international crisis, or m  
tune of war7
The existence of such a "positivist" argument affirming the complete 
illegality of using nuclear weapons under international law might very 
well be useful to a prosecutor at some future international war crimes 
trial similar to the Nuremberg Tribunal that is established m  the 
aftermath of a nuclear holocaust for the purpose of trying both U S and 
Soviet government officials and military officers who launched or waged a 
nuclear war for the commission of crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and 
genocide, among other international crimes The fact that many 
responsible legal commentators m  the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
around the world were arguing that the use of nuclear weapons was illegal 
under international law long before they were actually so used could very 
well exercise a decisive bearing upon the culpability of such 
defendants i
The author submits that at any such future war crimes tribunal held 
after a nuclear holocaust the judges would rule unanimously that as of 
1985 the use of nuclear weapons was absolutely prohibited under all 
circumstances by both conventional and customary international law 
Therefore, all Soviet and American government officials and militarv 
officers who either launched or waged a nuclear war would be guiltv of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, gra/e breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions, and genocide, at a minimum, and would not be 
entitled to the defenses of superior orders, act of state, duress, 
necessity, etc They could thus be quite legitimately and most severely 
ounished as war criminals, up to and including the unpos^t.on of the death 
oenalty
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This prediction, which the author states with a high degree of 
confidence, provides little solace, comfort or guidance for foreign 
affairs and defense policy decision-makers today The real purpose of 
public international law is not to punish violators on an ex post facto 
basis, but rather to prevent, forestall, or deter war, and a nuclear war 
m  particular Consequently, it must be the purpose of professional 
academics to produce an analysis of the legality or illegality of the 
threat to use nuclear weapons by breaking that subject down into its 
constituent elements in a manner that could be made relevant and useful to 
real world government decision-makers in the design of U S nuclear 
weapons policies for today and tomorrow
From the decision-makers perspective, the major defect of the 
positivist approach to analyzing the legality vel non of the threat and 
use of nuclear weapons becomes its inability to comprehend and 
operationalize the undeniable fact of international political life that in 
real-world situations government decision-makers must oftentimes cnoose 
the least bad as good s A legal positivist approach prevents an analyst 
from making any discriminations between degrees of legality or illegality 
for the purpose of evaluating the propriety or a particular foreign 
affairs or defense policy decision and, consequently, from discerning any 
gradual imorovement in or deterioration of che policy during the course or 
its development From a legal positivist perspective, a rore.gn affairs 
or defense policy decision is essent.allv either legal or .Ilegal, once 
and for all time But international political decision—making cannot 
realistically hope to be conducted on the oasis of such a completely 
d^chocomous and static viewpoint of the world, especially when .t comes to 
the critical issue or nuclear deterrence
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No matter how regrettable it might be, for the immediate future tf S 
government decision-makers must learn how to discriminate among the 
various nuclear weapons policies they have under consideration from an 
international law perspective m  order to promote those policies which are 
more lawful, when possible, or at least less illegal, when necessary, over 
those which are less lawful or more illegal, respectively In this manner 
U S nuclear decision-makers could select that policy or combination of 
policies which would move 0 S nuclear deterrence doctrine m  a direction 
that is less objectionable under the rules of international law than the 
one the b S government currently pursues In contrast to the traditional 
legal positivist approach to international relations, such a 
’functionalist * analysis of the legality or illegality ot threatening to 
use nuclear weapons could prepare the way for incremental improvements m  
U S nuclear deterrence doctrine and practice 7 A functionalist 
approach to this subject can provide an analytical mechanism for 
generating progressive movement out of the so-called paradox ot 
deterrence * that now confronts U S foreign affairs and defense 
decision-makers
Atter all, that is the traditional role considerations ot 
ntematiOnal law are supposed to play It is oftentimes the case m  
preign atfairs decísion-making that a policy cased upon sound 
considerations of international law typically reoresents a good and 
eventually successful strategy However, it is almost invariably the case 
t^at a oolicy tfhich violates fundamental principles or international law 
iS an unsound ana unworkable approach that _s usually counterproducti/e _n 
tHe short-term and ultimately seif-defeating o/er the long-naul ..curse ot 
international relations The author submits that such is ana mstonca.lv
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has been the case with U S nuclear deterrence policies and practices If 
current U S nuclear deterrence doctrine is not progressively brought into 
some degree of accordance with the rules of international law, it will 
ultimately fail to prevent a nuclear war because of its own intrinsic 
contradictions, inconsistencies and incongruities It is the purpose of 
this study to focus considerations of international law upon & S nuclear 
deterrence doctrine and practice Not in the expectation that nuclear 
weapons are going to be abolished m  the near future, but m  the belief 
that the pursuit of deterrence policies which pay attention to 
considerations of international law are more conducive to the maintenance 
of international peace and security and thus to the prevention of a 
nuclear war
To be sure, the alternative argument has been made oy some academic 
international political scientists that the world would be a lot safer 
place if every state possessed a secure second-strike strategic nuclear 
weapons capability, or m  the alternative that a moderate amount ot 
nuciear proliferation throughout certain regions m  the world should 
purposefully be encouraged by the current nuclear weapons states 4 sue" 
notions are naive and fatally dangerous; to the future of manicind No time 
will be spent here attempting to refute these speculative nypotheses s.nce 
they have gained few adherents among either the scnoiarly community or 
government officials, let alone the professional milxtarv and intelligence 
establishments The U S government s vigorous support for the -°63 
Treaty on tbe Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons4 atill -emains tae 
onlv viable alternative to the instigation of some rature regional luclear 
war with ootentially global catastrophic consequences
-S-
The U S Government’s Argument for the Legality of Using Nuclear Weapons
Despite the above criticisms, however, this new spate of literature on 
the legality yel non of using nuclear weapons has proven to be most useful 
because it has opened up a debate on a subject that had long been 
considered well-settled* The official position of the United States 
government asserting the permissibility of using nuclear weapons tor the 
purposes of legitimate self-defense has historically been based on the 
rationale enunciated m  paragraph 35 of the 1956 Department of the Army 
Field Manual 27-10 on The Law of Land Warfare 10
The use of explosive "atomic weapons, ' whether by air, sea, 
or land forces, cannot as stich be regarded as violative of 
international law m  the absence of any customary rule of 
international law or international convention restricting their 
employment [Emphasis added»]
To the same effect is paragraph 613 of the 1955 Department of the Navy 
Field Manual NWIP 10-2 on The Law of Naval Wartare 11
There is at present no rule of international law expressly 
prohibiting States from the use or nuclear weapons m  wartare 
In the absence of express prohibition, the use of such weapons 
against enemy combatants and other military objectives is 
oermitted * [Footnote m  the original 1 
According to the United States government, if the actual use of nuclear 
weapons is permissible m  legitimate self-defense under article 51 of ->e 
In^ted Nations Charter, then a fortiori it is certainly Lawfu^ merely »o 
threaten their use m  order to deter an offensive nuc-ear or conventional 
attacK by the Soviet Union uDon America or the European members of the
NATO alliance
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A1though there exist substantial differences between these two 
formulations of the American rationale purporting to justify both the use 
of nuclear weapons and, by implication, the threat of their use (which 
will be analyzed below), these phraseologies are motivated by the same 
underlying conception of international law and its relationship to state 
sovereignty Namely, that state conduct which is not expressly prohibited 
by a positive norm of international law is therefore permitted This 
doctrine is known m  the international legal studies profession as the 
'prohibitive*' theory of international law It stands m  contrast to the 
diametrically opposed * permissive * theory, which holds that a state is 
free to do only that which it is expressly permitted to do by a positive 
norm of international law
3y definition, adherence to the 'prohibitive * theory creates an almost 
irrefutable presumption m  favor of state sovereignty at the expense of 
international law whenever the latter is silent, and thus concedes an 
enormous degree of freedom and discretion to governments m  their conduct 
of international relations» Whereas the ’permissive* theory is 
purposefully intended to severely restrict the scope of state sovereignty 
within the presumably well-defined boundaries ot international law Quite 
predictably, therefore, for reasons of national self-interest the member 
states of the international comminity have generally subscriben to the 
prohibitive ' theory of international law as the correct approach, and 
have repudiated the 'permissive ’ theory as utopian speculation by academic 
theorists that is at gross variance with the facts of international ufe 
*n recognit-.cn of, or perhaps j.n deference to, this well—nigh universal 
sentiment espoused by the governments of the wor-d community, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice long-ago adopted the
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'prohibitive * theory and expressly rejected the "permissive" theory as the 
proper formulation of the relationship between international law and state 
sovereignty m  the famous case of the S S Lotus (1927) 12
These two quite peremptory statements by the U S Army and the U S 
Navy have been routinely trotted out and cited by government lawyers, 
governmental apologists among international lawyers m  academia or private 
practice, and other supporters of 0 S nuclear weapons policy to justify 
whatever was (and currently is) the then fashionable U S nuclear 
deterrence doctrine as being essentially consistent with, or at least not 
m  violation of, the requirements of international law By successfully 
propagating the general belief that American nuclear deterrence policy 
creates no serious problems under international law, these two statements 
have either directly or indirectly exercised a profound influence upon 
international lawyers, government officials, professional academics, the 
military establishment, and through the medium of these elite groups, uoon 
U.S public opinion Even more insidiously, these two statements have 
contributed to the development of the facile yet erroneous opinion among 
such elite groups that U S nuclear deterrence policy is a matter 
concerning the highest national security interest of America and thus the 
entire ,Trree fcorld, * and which therefore must exist as some metaphysical 
entity acove and beyond the domain of international ^av In other words, 
international legal considerations are incorrectly deemed to oe 
essentially irrelevant when it comes to anv evaluation of »-he orooriety 
of the threat to use nuclear weaoons by the United States government 13 
Moreover, despite all the /arious evolutionary stages U S nuciear 
deterrence aoctrme has proceeded through since 1955, the purported Legai 
justification has remained the same America s rationale for the
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legitimacy of its threat to use nuclear weapons has remained untouched by 
time and uninfluenced by technological advances m  nuclear weaponry, 
strategy, and destructiveness for over three decades These unilateral 
and self-serving policy pronouncements by two branches of the U S armed 
services have essentially been spared from systematic examination and 
authoritative critique from the time of their original promulgation during 
the Eisenhower Administration operating under its doctrine of ’massive 
retaliation”,14 to the Kennedy Administration and its doctrine of 
mutual assured destruction” (MAD),1* through the Johnson Administration 
and its doctrine of ’’flexible response' for NATO,18 and the Nixon 
Administration with its "Schlesinger Doctrine",17 until the Carter 
Administration’s Presidential Directive 5918 (that naively contemplated 
the possibility of America 'fighting” a 'limited” nuclear war), which was, 
in turn, essentially endorsed and embellished upon by Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger’s 1982 Five-Year Defense Guidance Statement, that boldly 
proclaimed the objective of America prevailing” m  a protracted nuclear 
*ar 19 Common sense dictates that over a quarter century of history 
demands a re-examination of the rationale behind the allegea legality of 
U S nuclear weapons deterrence policy
ror example, m  another pathbreaking decision rendered just betöre 
Lotus, the Permanent Court of International Justice neld m  the case of 
tne Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees (1923) that as the strength ot the 
international legal order develops and improves over time the domain of 
state sovereignty necessarily diminishes m  direct proportion 0 In 
recognition of this dynamic relationship between international .aw and 
state sovereignty, paragraph 35 ot the ü S Army v.eld Manual astutely 
left ooen the possibility that developments m  the legal, organizational
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and political relationships between the states of the international 
community after 1956 could very well have created a "customary rule of 
international law" that by 1985 expressly prohibits both the threat and 
use of nuclear weapons "as such" under all circumstances * including for 
the alleged purpose of legitimate self-defense There have been a fairly 
large number of developments m  the field of international law between 
then and now that cast serious doubt on the continued validity of these 
two seminal statements uttered m  the mid-1950s Zl But putting these 
developments of the past thirty years aside for the time being* was the 
basic proposition that the use of nuclear weapons* and a fortiori the 
threat of their use* were not as such" illegal when enunciated by the 
îî S government m  1955-1956 really an accurate statement of international 
law as it stood at the time7
The Relevance of the Nuremberg Principles to Nuclear Deterrence
No point would be served here by the production of yet another 
comprehensive catalogue of all the numerous violations of customary and 
conventional international Law that might arise from the use of nuclear 
weapons* as of either 1955 or today, since that task has been most 
competently discharged elsewhere But it would be worthwhile to 
discuss the relevance of one seminal source of customary international law 
to the issue of the legality vel non ot (I S nuclear weaDons deterrence 
policy This preliminary oojection to the validity of tne position taken 
by the Army and Navy with respect to the legality of using nuclear weapons 
was just as valid m  1955 as -t -s today
Article 6(a) of the 1945 Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal suOaeauently established at Nuremberg to prosecute and ounisn
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Nazi war criminals defined the term "crime against peace" to mean 
planning, preparation* initiation or waging of a war of aggression* or a 
war m  violation of international treaties* agreements or assurances* or 
participation m  a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing ' Nuremberg Charter article 6(b) defined the term 'war 
crime" to include "murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or 
for any other purpose of civilian population of or m  occupied territory, 
murder or ill—treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas* 
killing of hostages* plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages* or devastation not justified by 
military necessity " Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defined the 
term 'crime against humanity" to include 'murder, extermination, 
enslavement* deportation* and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population
Article 6 also provided that leaders, organizers, instigators, and 
accomplices participating m  the formulation or execution of a common plan 
or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons m  
execution of such plan Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter denied the 
applicability of the 'act of state defense to them by making it clear 
that the official position of chose who have committed &uch nemous crimes 
'shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or tutigatmg 
punishment Finally, article 8 provided that the fact an individuai 
acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a superior snail not 
free him from responsioility, but may be considered m  mitigation of 
punishment if justice so requires
The principles of international law recognized bv the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and tne Judgment of the Tribunal23 itself were
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affirmed by a unanimous vote of the United Nations General Assembly m  
Resolution 95(1) on December 11, 1946 24 Since that tune, the Nuremberg 
Principles have universally been considered to constitute an authoritative 
statement of the rules of customary international law dictating individual 
criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes*25 Under the general principle of customary 
international law creating "universality" of jurisdiction for the 
prosecution and punishment of those alleged to have committed such heinous 
offenses,25 all U S. government officials and members of the Ü S 
military forces who might order or participate m  a strategic nuclear 
attack upon the Soviet Union could lawfully be tried by any government of 
the world community that subsequently obtains control over them for crimes 
against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes, inter alia
The very existence of such heinous offenses and of personal criminal 
responsibility for the cosmission thereof is expressly recognized and 
affirmed by paragraph 498 of that same 1956 U S Army Field Manual on The 
Law of Land Warfare 27 Yet simultaneously and quite inexplicably the 
Manual apparently asserts the non-illegality ot using nuclear weapons 
during wartime m  paragraph 35* Furthermore, paragraph 500 thereof 
exnressly provides that 'Conspiracy, direct incitement, and attempts to 
commit, as well as complicity m  the commission of, crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes are punisnable ,2Ä
Does not contemporary U S nuclear deterrence policv constitute 
planning, preparation and conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, 
crimes against numanity, and war crimes7 Are not the nuclear 
decision-makers of the Reagan administration thus subject to persorai 
criminal responsibility and punishment under the Nuremberg Prmciples for
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currently pursuing the development of a U S ’»protracted nuclear 
war-prevailing** capability9 In any event, does there not exist an 
incredible inconsistency if not a serious incompatibility between 
paragraph 35 of the 1956 US. Army Field Manual, on the one hand, and 
paragraphs 498, 499,29 500, and 501,30 inter alia, on the other9 If 
so, what are the ramifications of this gross discrepancy for both the 
validity and the effectiveness of the contemporary U S nuclear deterrent 
m  theory and practice?
At the very minimum, under the Nuremberg Principles, the U S nuclear 
destruction of Soviet civilian population centers would be absolutely 
prohibited under all circumstances.31 This proposition would be true 
even if such a countercity attack was undertaken as a measure of 
retaliation m  response to a prior nuclear attack against U S population 
centers by the Soviet Union 32 But if the actual destruction of 
civilian population centers is prohibited under all circumstances, how can 
a theory of strategic nuclear deterrence that threatens to destroy cities 
be justified under international law9
The simplistic answer to this objection would be that the Nuremberg 
®PP^y only to the actual use of nuclear weapons during 
wartime. Hence, arguably, it is perfectly lawful for a state m  peacetime 
to threaten to do something that would be completely unlawful to do m  
wartime, especially if the purpose of the peacetime threat is to prevent a 
nuclear or conventional war m  the first place This proposition is the 
cornerstone of the alleged ’paradox concerning the legality vel non of 
strategic nuclear deterrence
Of course this rationale fails to account *or the existence of the 
inchoate crimes incidental to war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes
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against humanity (viz , planning, preparation, conspiracy, incitement, 
attempt, complicity) that can be committed by government officials during 
peacetime and can thus create individual criminal responsibility for the 
commission thereof even before the outbreak of war The primary purpose 
for recognizing the existence of such inchoate crimes with respect to war 
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity was to deter, 
prevent, or forestall the commission of the substantive offenses m  the 
first place 33
Once again, the simplistic response to this objection would be that 
the recognition of such inchoate crimes with respect to nuclear deterrence 
is counterproductive to maintaining a credible nuclear balance between the 
two superpowers that is supposedly necessary to preserve world peace from 
nuclear Armageddon According to this rationale, the application ot the 
concept of inchoate crimes from the Nuremberg Principies to the issue of 
nuclear deterrence would weaken the credibility of the deterrent itself 
and therefore increase the risks of war In other words, th*s argument 
reduces itself to the bald-faced and reprehensible Machiavellian 
proposition that the ends justify the means Yet the rules ot 
international law have been formulated precisely for the purpose of 
evaluating the propriety of both the ends and the means of international 
behavior pursued by governments and fore-gn policy decision-makers al*<e 
That point was made quite clear by the Nuremberg Tribunal to the Nazi war 
criminals It would also be made quite clear by a Nuclear Holocaust 
Tribunal to any surviving American and Soviet civilian and military 
leaders
Conversely, however, if the U S government actually relies upon this 
instrumentalist argument m  order to justify its current doctrine of
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nuclear deterrence under international law, then it would have to concede 
that m  the event the Soviet Onion ever used nuclear weapons or 
conventional forces against the United States of America or NATO, the 
United States could not under any circumstances respond with the use of 
nuclear weapons against Soviet population centers According to strategic 
theory, the nuclear deterrent has been developed m  order to deter, not to 
be used. Once deterrence has actually failed, the supposed justification 
for the threat to use nuclear weapons disappears, and the actual use of 
nuclear weapons in a countercity mode would still remain absolutely 
prohibited. Clearly this has not been the policy of the United States 
government since at least the time of the Eisenhower administration and 
its doctrine of ’massive retaliation ”34
A threat to do that which is illegal under any circumstances where it 
is almost inevitable that the threat will be carried out under a variety 
of circumstances is a materially different phenomenon from such a threat 
111 the abstract If it was clear that once deterrence had failed 
the United States government would never use nuclear weapors against 
Soviet population centers, then some doctrine of strategic nuclear 
deterrence might theoretically be able to be justified under international 
law But when a countercity threat has historically been implemented as 
the basis for the entirety of the U S strategic nuclear weapons 
establishment for the past thirty years, such a threat becomes 
presumptively illegal And it is the presumptive illegality of that 
threat to use nuclear weapons against Soviet population centers under any 
circumstances that lies at the heart of U S strategic nuclear weapons 
deterrence doctrine -n theory and practice both today and m  the past
Here there exists an enormous incongruity between the requirements of 
international law and the current status of U S strategic nuclear weapons
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deterrence theory A somewhat more lawful policy would at least proclaim 
that although the United States government might be able to threaten to 
use nuclear weapons during peacetime, m  the event of a nuclear or 
conventional attack upon the United States or NATO 6y the Soviet Union, 
America would not under any circumstances actually use its nuclear weapons 
against Soviet population centers Yet would not the mere public 
articulation of this policy weaken the credibility of the deterrent itself 
and thus invite a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack upon the United 
States or NATO9
Proponents of contemporary U S nuclear deterrence doctrine have 
answered this question m  the affirmative, and have thus concluded that 
such a distinction must not be drawn Yet basic requirements of 
international law dictate to the contrary ’Mutual assured destruction* 
(MAD) and all its essential accouterments and contemporary refinements 
must be abandoned as the heart of America’s strategic nuclear deterrence 
policy The overarching question then becomes, however, whether or not 
the United States government should move m  the direction of the 
’’protracted nuclear war-prevalmg * doctrine advocated by the Reagan 
Administration as a desirable suds  ti tute for MAD m  accordance with 
international legal prescriptions That issue will be analyzed m  more 
detail below
The Lotus Case Versus the Martens Clause
There are even more serious oroblems of a jurisprudential nature that 
have not been addressed m  the L955-L956 statements by the U S government 
concerning the legality of using nuclear weapons during wartime As
-19-
mentioned above, both the Army and the Navy Field Manuals' justifications 
for using nuclear weapons are based upon a similar rationale, which m  
turn is premised upon a metaphysical speculation concerning the 
relationship between international law and state sovereignty Essentially 
the government’s argument reduces itself to the jurisprudential 
proposition that since the use of "atomic weapons" during wartime is not 
specifically by name prohibited by the rules of international law, states 
remain presumptively free to use them This particular formulation of the 
prohibitive" theory of international law and its relationship to state 
sovereignty is derived from the famous case of the S S  Lotus decided by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) m  1927 In that case 
the PCIJ gave the classic formulation to the prohibitive theory of 
international law in the following terms 3 5
International law governs relations between independent 
States The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate 
from their own free will as expressed m  conventions or by usages 
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established m  order to regulate the relations between these 
co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence 
of States cannot therefore be presumed
The Lotus Court came down decisively on the side of the prohibitive 
theory of international law, and therefore m  favor or state sovereignty 
whenever international law is not expressly applicable Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, the PCIJ had already indicated m  the Tunis-Morocco case 
of 1923 that as the rules of international law developed, so too the 
sovereigntv of states would be proportionately diminished and restricted
- 20-
Hence, applying the rationales of both Lotus and Tunis-Morocco to the 
matter of the legality of using nuclear weapons» it can be said that even 
though their use might not have been explicitly prohibited as of 1955, 
nevertheless their use could very well be prohibited as of 1985 because of 
numerous developments m  the field of international law and organizations 
during the interim* And the same could be said for the threat to use 
nuclear weapons under a variety of circumstances
The m a m  problem with the Army/Navy application of the Lotus case to 
the use of nuclear weapons is that the Lotus rationale was never intended 
to have any applicability to the international laws of humanitarian armed 
conflict operable during warfare At the time the Lotus case was decided, 
international law recognized a clearcut bifurcation into two mutually 
exclusive international legal orders the laws of peace and the laws of 
war 38 This bifurcation was due to the fact that before the 
promulgation of the United Nations Charter m  1945 there was no absolute 
prohibition upon a state from going to war, or threatening or using force 
m  international relations 37
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not prohibit a state from 
going to war, but simply set up a procedure that members of the League nad 
to follow and exhaust before they could go to war with another member of 
the League Under the regime of League of Nations Covenant articles 
11(1), 12(1), 13(4), and 15(6), states retained their primord-al right to 
resort to war to protect and advance their own interests, out only upon 
the fulfillment of the conditions specified therein 3* Moreover, the 
Covenant had no such requirement for relations between League memoers ana 
non-members, or a fortiori for relations between non-memoers among 
themselves Since the United States never became a member of the League,
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Germany did not join until 1926,5* and the U S S R  until 1934,40 this 
yawning gap in the Covenant's coverage was quite substantial
To be sure, shortly after the Lotus decision was rendered, the states 
of the world community concluded the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, by 
means of which they agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national 
policy 41 However, during the negotiation of the Pact, several parties 
made it quite clear that they reserved to themselves the right to resort 
to war in self-defense m  accordance with their own determination of the 
necessity to do so 42 In deference to the fundamental principle of 
international law and politics recognizing the sovereign equality of 
states, according to the legal doctrine known as "reciprocity of 
reservations"45 other parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact that had not 
specifically made such a reservation were entitled to invoke it against 
any state party which had So even the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not on its 
face expressly preclude the right to go to war, let alone threaten or use 
force, m  self-defense as unilaterally determined by the state itself Of 
course, however, after the Second World War the Judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal decisively repudiated this self-judging element of the 
self-defense exception to the Kellogg-Briand Pact when it was invoked by 
the Nazi war criminals.44,
LPtus was decided m  an era when it was well recognized that the laws 
of peace and the laws of war were comoletely different entities that 
represented two separate and independent legal orders And although the 
Lotus rationale (ì e , that which is not specifically prohibited is 
presumptively permitted) applied throughout the operation of the 
international laws of peace, that was not necessarily the case when it 
came to the application of the international laws of humanitarian armed
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conflict during wartime The Lotus case itself made no attempt at all to 
apply the prohibitive theory of international law to a wartime situation 
Any attempt to apply the Lotus rationale to the laws of war runs up 
against an implacable and fatal obstacle the so-called Martens 
Clause.45 The Martens Clause essentially established a diametrically 
opposed presumption when it came to the employment of new weapons m  
conditions of warfare Namely, that a state was not free to use any new 
weapon it wanted to use so long as it was not specifically prohibited from 
so doing by a positive norm of international law Rather, the burden of 
proof was upon the state itself to justify the use of the new weapon under 
the existing norms for the international laws of humanitarian armed 
conflict To quote from the Martens Clause as found, for example, m  the 
Preamble to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, Concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land,4® which m  turn the Nuremberg Tribunal 
subsequently held to be binding upon all states as a matter of customary 
international law at the time of the outbreak of the Second World War 47 
Until a more suitable code of laws of war can be drawn uo, the 
high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, m  
cases not covered by the rules adopted by them, the inhabitants 
and the belligerents remain under the protection and governance 
of the general principles of the law of nations, derived from the 
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of 
humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience 
Thus it is the permissive theory of international law, not the prohibitive 
theory as articulated by Lotus, that applies when it comes to determining 
the propriety of using new weapons during warfare
Applying the rationale of the Martens Clause to nuclear weapons, one 
would have to conclude that the only possible use of nuclear weapons that
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might in an abstract and totally theoretical sense be "justifiable" is one 
that would* at a mínimum, be completely consistent with the conventional 
and customary international law* of humanitarian armed conflict (i e , the 
jus in bello) Yet it is extremely difficult to imagine what such 
circumstances might be And whatever these exceedingly rare circumstances 
conceivably justifying the use of nuclear weapons might possibly be (e g , 
a so-called "battlefield" nuclear war m  Europe, to be discussed below), 
it is clear that the current U S* strategic nuclear deterrence doctrine 
and practice are neither limited by nor confined to them If nuclear 
weapons cannot be used m  a manner that does not violate the humanitarian 
laws of armed conflict, then they cannot be used even during a war of 
legitimate self-defense And the sao» can be said for the threat of their 
use against cities for the alleged purpose of deterring aggression The 
rationale of the Lotus case is simply irrelevant to the question of 
whether or not the threat or use of nuclear weapons is lawful during peace 
or war
The Precedential Significance of America s Response to Germany s Policy of 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare During the First World War
The fundamental imoortance of the *!artens Clause to the conduct of 
international armed conflict is not simply a matter of scholarly or 
pedantic interest alone For the United States of America ultimately 
intervened and fought m  the First World War precisely m  order to 
vindicate the ormciple of international law enunciated therein Namely, 
that new weapons of warfare, and especially instruments of indiscriminate 
mass destruction, are subject to the traditional laws ot humanitarian
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armed conflict During the period of formal American neutrality from 
1914 to 1917, it was generally believed within the United States that the 
quality and quantity of violations of both customary and conventional 
international law committed by the Allied Powers were of a nature and 
purpose materially different from and far less heinous than those 
perpetrated by the Central Powers (i e , destruction of property versus 
destruction of life and property, respectively) Of decisive impact upon 
American public opinion and governmental decísion-making processes was 
Germany’s wanton and indiscriminate destruction of innocent human life 
(American, neutral, and enemy civilian) by institution of its policy of 
’’unrestricted” submarine warfare against merchant vessels and passenger 
ships Such behavior was in express violation of several provisions ot 
the unratifled Declaration of London (1909) that were generally considered 
not only to state the customary international law of maritime warfare but, 
moreover, to embody rudimentary norms of humanitarian conduct for any 
civilized nation during wartime.
Tactically, German submarine warfare could only partiallv compensate 
for the preponderant surface naval supremacy fielded by Great Britain and 
her allies, who were then quite successfully imposing an economic 
stranglehold on all neutral commerce that could possibly be destined for 
Germany and her allies It was extremelv dangerous for a submarine to 
forego the security afforded by undetected submersion m  order to surtace 
and comply with the rules for interdiction of enemy or neutral merchant 
vessels suspected of transporting contraband that vere applicable to 
surface warships as set forth m  the unratified Declaration of London 
Indeed, it had become standard 3ritish practice to arm its merchant 
vessels vith defensive weapons sufficient to destroy a thm-hulled
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submarine should it surface, and also to fly neutral flags on British 
merchant vessels m  order to deceive enemy submarine commanders Under 
these circumstances, application of the laws for maritime warfare 
described m  the Declaration of London to the conduct of hostilities by 
submarines would m  effect have essentially precluded this new device for 
waging war for most practical purposes, and thus have provided Great 
Britain and her allies with a virtually uninterrupted stream of military 
and commercial products purchased from merchants in neutral states, most 
particularly the United States, for the duration of the war
Legally, of course, the German government justified its policy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare as a legitimate measure of reprisal for the 
grievous and repeated British violations of the unratified Declaration of 
London and generally recognized rules of international law, both of which 
Germany alleged it had been strictly obeying Tn addition, Germany 
complained that the neutral powers, and especially the United States, had 
been either unable or unwilling to exert enough pressure upon Great 
Britain to secure its compliance with customary and conventional laws of 
maritime warfare and neutrality m  order to guarantee the continuation of 
their nationals recognized right to trade with Germany and her allies 
The neutral states collective failure to effectively prosecute their 
rights against Great Britain or, m  the alternative, their refusal to at 
least dimmish proportionately the free flow of weapons, munitions and 
supplies to Britain by their own merchants, worked to the substantial 
military and economic detriment of Germany
Notwithstanding the validity of some of these German oojections, as 
far as American oublie and governmental opinion was concerned, if this new 
instrumentality of warfare could not be effectively utilized without
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violating international law, then Germany must jettison the submarine» not 
the humanitarian laws of armed conflict. Germany's persistent refusal to 
relent and its consequent sinking of merchant ships with large loss of 
life directly precipitated the U S. decision to intervene into the war 
against Germany and later Austria-Hungary» which had endorsed the German 
practices As President Woodrow Wilson succinctly phrased it m  his April 
2» 1917 request to a joint session of Congress for a declaration of war 
against Germany "The present German submarine warfare against comnerce 
is a warfare against mankind ,4S America's decision to abandon its 
neutrality and enter the war ineluctably spelled defeat tor the Central 
Powers This proved to be the definitive and most effective "sanction* 
for Germany’s egregious violation of the international laws of 
humanitarian armed conflict by employing this new and quite effective 
weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction.
Just as the United States government adamantly insisted that the laws 
of humanitarian armed conflict applied to German submarines during the 
First World War, so too the same rationale would apply to the threat and 
use of nuclear weapons. Just as America-argued that the fact the 
submarine could not be effectively used m  a manner that was not violative 
of international law was not sufficient to justify its use» so too tne 
same rationale would apply to prohibit the threat and use ot nuciear 
weapons today Although international law did not specifically prohibit 
submarines ’as such then and does not specifically prohibit nuclear 
weapons as such* now, nevertheless if these novel instrumentalities o* 
xndiscriminate mass destruction could not or cannot be used m  a manner 
that does not violate international law, then they could not or cannot be 
used Based upon the legal and Dolitical precedent established by the
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ü S government with respect to submarines from 1914 to 1917, the correct 
response to this dilemma is not, as some international lawyers have 
recently suggested* to declare that nuclear weapons have made the laws of 
war obsolete Rather, the solution to the "paradox of deterrence" is the 
realization that the international laws of humanitarian armed conflict 
require nuclear weapons to be rendered obsolete as soon as possible How 
that goal can be achieved will be discussed m  the concluding section of 
this article
Paragraph 35 of the ü S Army Field Manual Reconsidered
The 1955-56 statements by the ü S Navy and Army do not attempt to 
grapple with any of these issues or even allow them to interfere with 
their automatic application of the Lotus rationale to allegedly justify
the use of nuclear weapons m  wartime. Furthermore, they seem to blithely
/
ignore both the Martens Clause and the Nuremoerg Principles Is this 
defect attributable to faulty analysis on the part of the drafters of 
these statements9 At least m  regard to paragraph 35 of the 1956 b S 
Army Field Manual, the answer to that question must clearly be m  the 
negative The 1956 ü S Army Field Manual on The Law of Land Warfare was 
drafted anonymously by the late Richard R Baxter, then Professor of 
International Law at the Harvard Law School, and subsequently Judge oc the 
International Court of Justice a0 One thing that all his fellow 
international law colleagues would agree uoon .s that Richard 3axter was a 
meticulously precise drafter of international legal documents For 
several years Professor Baxter taugnt the course on International i-egal 
Drafting at the Harvard Law School
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Therefore, in deference to the memory and prodigious talents of 
Professor Baxter, we have to go back and reread the language of the 1956 
Army statement quite carefully If so, we can discern that paragraph 35 
of the 1956 Army Field Manual never really supported the standard 
interpretation accorded to it by government lawyers and their 
private-sector apologists to the effect that nuclear weapons can 
permissibly be used during wartime Referring again to paragraph 35 as 
quoted above, particular attention should be paid to the words "as such" 
The use of explosive "atomic weapons,* wnether by air, sea, 
or land forces, cannot as such be regarded as violative of 
international law m  the absence of any customary rule of 
international law or international convention restricting their 
employment [Emphasis added.]
A close reading of this paragraph would indicate that all Professor 
Baxter intended to say was that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be 
regarded as violative of international law solely because they are 
atomic’ as opposed to "conventional" weapons Tn other words, there is 
no one conventional or customary rule of international law that 
specifically prohibits the use of atomic" weapons by that name —  for 
example, similar to the international conventions specifically prohibiting 
the use or poison,Sl expanding bullets,52 or poison gas, 
bacteriological weapons, toxins,33 etc Arguably, of course, the use of 
nuclear weapons might be pronibited by implication from the terms of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 54 3ut the Inited States did not become a party 
to this convention until 1975, almost twenty years sifter Professor Baxter 
drafted the U S Army Field Manual
The interesting part of this particular formulation is what Professor 
Baxter left out Paragraph 35 never states that the actual use of nuclear
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weapons would not be in violation of the international laws of 
humanitarian armed conflict and the laws of war Professor Baxter was too 
good a draftsman and an international lawyer ever to attempt to make such 
a specious and reprehensible argument Also* the 1956 Army statement so 
carefully drafted by Professor Baxter purposefully did not repeat the 
grievous error committed by the 1955 Navy statement, which boldly 
proclaimed "In the absence of express prohibition, the use of such 
weapons against enemy combatants and other military objectives is 
permitted " (Emphasis added ) And whatever its defects, even this 1955 
Navy statement never went so far as to assert that nuclear weapons could 
lawfully be used against civilian population centers, as ooposed to 
legitimate military targets
In contrast, Professor Baxter never said that the use of nuclear 
weapons is permitted under any circumstances He simply stated that their 
use is not violative of international law simply because they are 'atomic ' 
as opposed to "conventional’ weapons Furthermore, Professor Baxter never 
intended to imply that nuclear weapons were exempted to any extent from 
the application of the customary and conventional international laws of 
humanitarian armed conflict To a lawyer who selflessIv devoted a 
substantial part of his professional career to the imorovement ot this 
somewhat exotic field of law' (to use his own apoellation), *t would have 
been an apocryphal and highly offensive statement
This author was privileged enough to have taken Professor Baxter s 
course on The Laws of War at the Harvard -aw School m  the Spring Semester 
of 1975 At that time an entire two—hour class session was devoted to 
analyzing the legality or illegality of us^ng nuclear weapons under 
international law This author was struck by the precision with which
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Professor Baxter dissected the meaning of paragraph 35 He never said 
that the use of nuclear weapons was permitted under the international laws 
of humanitarian armed conflict Nor did he say that the use of nuclear 
weapons fell outside their reach To the contrary, the thrust of his 
analysis seemed to be that the traditional laws of war applied to the use 
of nuclear weapons, and that "as such’* the actual use of nuclear weapons 
would be m  violation of the customary and conventional international laws 
of humanitarian armed conflict
As Professor Baxter ohrased the dilemma quite succinctly m  a written 
question posed for class discussion Would it be possible to frame any 
workable rules on the employment of nuclear weapons falling short of an 
outright prohibition7* (Emphasis added ) In the opinion ot this author, 
Professor Baxter never answered that question m  the affirmative oecause 
he found it exceedingly difficult to conceive of any such circumstances 
where the use of nuclear weapons that was then realistically contemolated 
by the United States government could be permissible under the 
international laws of humanitarian armed conflict It seemed pretty clear 
from the class discussion that Professor Baxter did not believe it 
possible to formulate such rules because the use of nuclear weapons simplv 
could not be justified under international law s
This author would submit, therefore, that paragraph 35 of che U 5 
^rmy Field v!anual as drarted by Richard R 3axter *as never intended to 
imply that the use of nuclear weapons vould not /îolate the international 
laws of humanitarian armed conflict, whether customary o” conventional 
Hence government lawyers and the-r academic apologists are completai/ 
incorrect to cite paragraph 35 m  support or the dubious orooosition that 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be permissible by the United
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States government in legitimate self-defense during peace or war Indeed, 
at the very time Professor Baxter was busy drafting the ü S Army Field 
Manual, the Eisenhower Administration was promulgating its strategic 
nuclear deterrence doctrine known as "massive retaliation" upon Soviet 
population centers m  the event of a prior nuclear or conventional attack 
by the Soviet Union upon the United States or members of the NATO 
alliance Quite obviously the doctrine of "massive retaliation* 
represented the exact antithesis of Professor Baxter's cherished notion 
that there existed such a phenomenon known as the jus in bello
The Illegality of U S Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine Promotes Military 
Insubordination
The statement that there actually exists such an entity mown as the 
international laws of humanitarian armed conflict seems to represent a 
contradiction m  basic terms to many people who are ignorant of 
international law A fortiori this would appear to be the case when it 
comes to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which by definition seem to 
repudiate the very idea of the laws of war Those who scoff at the 
international laws of humanitarian armed conflict, however, are usually 
academic political scientists or civilian government officials who operate 
upon the hard-nosed 'realist* premise that war is hell, and thus there 
must be no rules when it comes to warfare, especially involving che use of 
nuclear weapons Yet the primary reason behind the historical development 
of ü S nuclear deterrence doctrine to the current point of imminent human 
extinction has been the completely antmomian prescriptions offered by 
academic think-tank theorists operating on the basis of such Machiavellian
assumptions
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Nevertheless * most of these civilian officials or theorists will not 
be directly involved m  the execution (though certainly some will be 
involved m  the planning and ordering) of any nuclear weapons attack by 
the United States government against the Soviet Union Rather the plans 
will be carried out by professional members of the United States military 
establishment It is a truism to state that the officers and enlisted men 
of the United States military represent the strongest group of individuals 
m  this country who give their full-fledged and unequivocal support to the 
humanitarian laws of armed conflict precisely because these rules were 
originally and primarily designed to protect them 58 Any U S civilian 
government official or academic theorist who believes to the contrary is 
dead wrong and acts at his peril in contradistinction to this basic fact 
Whether they like it or not* therefore« civilian nuclear decision—makers 
must take considerations of international law into acco tine because their 
military counterparts have been trained* and indeed ordered to do so 
It is a requirement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that all U S 
military personnel be indoctrinated -nto the international laws of 
humanitarian armed conflict 57 Part of this indoctrination includes the 
admonition that they must not carry out any order that they know to be 
illegal.5® Moreover, the Nuremberg Tribunal went even one step further 
by establishing personal criminal responsibility for participation by 
military subordinates m  the commission of crimes against peace« crimes 
against humanity and war crimes so long as there can be said to exist a 
moral choice * for them to refuse to obey clearly illegal orders to that 
effect 9
It was also submitted on behalf of most of these defendants 
that m  doing what they did they «rere acting under the orders of
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Hitler, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts 
committed by them m  carrying out these orders The Charter 
specifically provides m  Article 8
"The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of 
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from 
responsibility, but may be considered m  mitigation of 
punishment *
The provisions of this article are m  conformity with the law of 
all nations That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture m  
violation of the international law of war has never been 
recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality, though, as the 
Charter here provides, the order may b& urged m  mitigation of 
the punishment. The true test, which is found m  varying degrees 
m  the criminal law of most nations » is not the existence ot the 
or^er* whether moral choice was m  fact possible [Emphasis 
added ]
Thus, according to the Nuremberg Principles as well, all ü S military 
personnel assigned to nuclear missions would be obligated to refuse to 
perform any such illegal orders for waging strategic nuclear warfare 
against the Soviet Union upon pain of suffering personal criminal 
responsibility, punishment and perhaps execution as war criminals 
To be sure, it is not absolutely certain that members of the U S 
military establishment might not carry out orders given to them by 
civili3.n officials that are egregiously illegal such as a nuclear 
first-strike or countercity attack But there does exist a distinct 
probability that some soldiers might exercise their moral choice to refuse 
to do so And the distinct probability that some members of the lí S
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mil itary might refuse to obey egregiously unlawful orders given by 
civilian officials to wage a nuclear war against the Soviet Union provides 
the most compelling reason why U S. nuclear deterrence theory and practice 
must be reexamined in light of the rules of international law
To frame this problem m  a more concrete manner How should U S 
civilian government officials deal today with the fact that there exists a 
distinct possibility that the U.S military officer routinely assigned to 
accompany the President at all times with the code for launching U S 
nuclear weapons— contained in that infamous attache case handcuffed to his 
wrist— might someday m  the future refuse to allow the President access to 
the code when so ordered because he believed he was obligated by both 
international law and U S domestic law not to become an accomplice to the 
commission of crimes against peace» crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes9
A strategic nuclear deterrence policy that is totally inconsistent 
with international law, to which the U S military establishment fully 
subscribes, is militarily counterproductive and thus politically 
unworkable because it lacks credibility, consistency, ana staying power 
Deterrence as a theory can not succeed for the United States over the long 
run (which it must) if it is premised upon egregiously illegal and/or 
immoral assumptions that are totally unacceotable to the American people, 
to the civilian government officials m  charge of its design, and 
especially to the members of the Inited States military forces who would 
be in charge of its execution Tn particular, any U S nuclear deterrent 
doctrine must take into account the legal and moral training, beliefs, ard 
convictions of the members of the U S military establishment
For example, there have been reported instances m  which J S nuclear 
missile control officers have refused to fire under a mock nuclear
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attack There have been other instances in which IJ S nuclear missile 
control officers have asked to be relieved of their positions because they 
believed that their assigned missions were completely inconsistent with 
the laws of war training they had received when they were indoctrinated 
into the military* There is another instance where an IC3M missile 
control officer was trained to engage m  first-strike scenarios and 
subsequently left the military rather than continue to do so because he 
believed stich training to be illegal and inmoral 90
This author suspects that there exists a fairly large number of 
professional military officers and enlisted men assigned to nuclear 
missions who possess enormous doubts as to the legal and moral legitimacy 
of their delegated tasks If that is the case» how reliable are any of 
them9 Men and women are not robots They are going to question whatever 
order that might be given to them for the use of nuclear weapons m  any 
event, especially when it is highly probable that they will perish as a 
result of the process* As Professor Alfred Rubin from the Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy has aptly put it, a missile control officer who has 
been ordered to turn the key will think long and hard about it when he 
realizes that he himself will probably be meeting his creator m  less than 
fifteen minutes Sl He might decide that it is better to do so with a 
clean conscience rather than have to bear responsioility for uhe deaths of 
millions of people
The Nuremberg Tribunal expressly endowed *uch moral considerations 
with an international legal Significance when it established the 
appropriate standard of personal criminal responsibility for participation 
oy subordinates m  the commission of crimes against peace, crimes agairst 
humanity, and war crimes Hence, human morality— whether premised upon
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religious, ethical, or humanistic grounds— becomes both legally and 
therefore politically relevant to determining the validity and thus the 
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence Whether or not there is a heaven, it 
is certainly true that many, if not a majority of people m  the Ü S 
military services are religious, have faith m  God, and believe m  an 
afterlife If so, then the United States government cannot effectively 
assign to them nuclear missions which, m  their opinion, might put their 
souls m  eternal jeopardy According to the holding of the Nuremberg 
Judgment, they would be not simply entitled but indeed obligated to 
exercise their moral choice m  this matter by retusmg to obey clearly 
illegal orders given by their military superiors or civilian government 
officials to wage strategic nuclear warfare against the Soviet Union
Launch on Warning
The above argument is not intended to serve as an exoneration of the 
U S military establishment from any degree of legal and political 
resoonslbmty for the development of the world's nuclear predicament to 
the current point of impenaing extinction for the human race Vor is it 
intended to recommend the abolition of the constitutionally mandated 
system for civilian control over the military estadishment throughout tfe 
United States government In the event U S civilian government officials 
some day order their military subordinates to launch and vage a nuclear 
war against the Soviet Union, substantial numbers of J  S militar/ 
personnel vili undoubtedly do their utmost to discnarge their aDpoirted 
tasks, and the devastation vili be truly catastroohic for the entire
planet 3ut any notion that a counterforce nuclear war can oe kept
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”1 unitedM assumes» among other imponderables» that most if not all II S 
military personnel assigned to nuclear missions can and will do precisely 
what they are told This will certainly not be the case during a future 
nuclear crisis or war *2
Even more immediately, however, the fundamental illegality of U S 
nuclear deterrence doctrine and practice exercises a most profoundly 
corrosive effect on the internal fiber of the U S military 
establishment— just as it has done on the nature of the U S. 
constitutional system of government purportedly operating under the rule 
of law The essential lawlessness of nuclear deterrence not only promotes 
military insubordination, but also encourages both legal and illegal 
actions by concerned U S citizens to bring their government into 
compliance with the requirements of international, domestic, and 
constitutional law This latter issue of civil disobedience will be 
discussed m  more detail below.
Meanwhile, the inescapability ot this former dilemma— whereby the 
fundamental illegality of nuclear deterrence inevitably promotes military 
insubordination— has led some academic think-tank theorists to conclude 
that the human element must be removed from the Ü 5 nuclear command 
system Of course that would be impossible and unconstitutional to do 
completely Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Lnited States 
government must move to what is known as a launcn on warning nuclear 
response doctrine instead of the second-strike scenario it now supposedly 
adheres to According to this frightening concept, once I S satellites 
have sensed the launch of Soviet IC3Ms, the retaliation by U S ICB^s 
would be almost automatic, triggered by computer The definitive 
objection to this theory, however, is that the U S government has
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witnessed too many instances m  which its computers related to the sensing 
and ordering of a nuclear attack have malfunctioned ** If that has been 
the case for the United States, it must certainly be true for the Soviet 
Union operating under the restraints of its far less sophisticated 
satellite and computer technology*.
Overwhelming considerations of human survival should ineluctably 
compel the United States government to propose to the Soviet Union the 
conclusion of an international agreement expressly prohibiting their 
respective civilian government officials and military officers from ever 
adopting a "launch on warning" policy, as well as the testing and 
deployment of any technological measures or facilities ancillary thereto 
Yet today the Reagan Administration is rapidly deploying offensive, 
first-strike counterforce strategic nuclear weapons systems such as the 
MX, Trident 2/Delta 5 warhead, Pershing 2, and M m u teman 3/MK-12A 
warhead These new American weapons systems make it extraordinarily 
difficult for the Soviet Union to refrain from formally or informally 
adopting a ’launch on warning * policy, whereupon the United States 
government would feel compelled to respond m  kind Mutual adoption or 
launch on warning" policies by both superpowers would create an enormous, 
almost inexorable incentive for either one to strike first m  the event 
another critical geopolitical cr~s*s oreaks out between them along the 
lines of the Berlin Airlift, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Yom Kippur 
War
There exists no conceivable justification under international law pcr 
the deployment of any one ot these otfensive, f^rst-stn<e counterforts 
strategic nuclear weapons systems, Let alone all four simultaneously 4 
The only argument m  their favor is the Reagan Administration s
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MachiaveIlian assertion that it is necessary for the ü S government to 
develop the capability to "prevail" m  a "protracted nuclear war" —  not 
in the realistic expectation that a counterforce strategic nuclear war can 
actually be fought and won* but in the misguided belief that obtaining the 
apparent capability to do so will more effectively deter a nuclear or 
conventional attack by the Soviet Union upon the United States or NATO 
than could either MAD or "flexible response " But if that premise is 
invalid* then the supposed need for the deployment of this new 
unprecedented generation of U S. first-strike counterforce strategic 
nuclear weapons systems disappears These complex issues of nuclear and 
conventional deterrence will be addressed m  the following sections of 
this article
Analyzing the Legality or Illegality of the Reagan Administration * 
’Protracted Nuclear War-Prevailing" Deterrence Doctrine
Quite recently and most insidiously* members or the U S foreign 
affairs and defense establishment have been invoking the sentiment behind 
the international laws of humanitarian armed conflict m  order to 
manipulate some people into supporting the proposition that the Reagan 
Administration’s announced intention to develop the capability to 
prevail ’ m  a protracted nuclear war is somenow more humane ' and 
therefore more lawful ’ or at least ' less illegal than preceding theories 
of strategic nuclear deterrence pursued by the United States government 
such as MAD or 'flexible -esponse ss ThxS specious argument maintains 
tnat by creating for the President the option of ordering a limited 
nuclear strike against Soviet ICBM silos and hardened command centers by
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means of the prior deployment of new counterforce strategic nuclear 
weapons systems such as the MX, Pershing 2, Minuteman 3/MK-12A warhead, 
and the Trident 2/Delta 5 warhead, in the event of a Soviet first-strike 
against OS. ICBM silos the President could at least initially avoid 
ordering an all-out strategic nuclear attack upon Soviet population 
centers and therefore, hopefully, avert global nuclear suicide According 
to this rationale, when analyzed from the perspective of the humanitarian 
laws of armed conflict, such counterforce nuclear weapons become 
preferable to extant strategic nuclear weapons systems which do not 
possess the requisite combination of survivability, reliability, speed, 
accuracy, ability to penetrate defenses, and explosive power necessary to 
be used m  a counterforce as opposed to their traditional countercity mode 
Superficially, therefore, considerations of international law might at 
first glance seem to support the Reagan Administration s shift from MAD to 
developing a "protracted nuclear war-prevailmg" capability because, 
somewhat paradoxically, the latter s underlying counterforce philosophy 
seems to more closely comport with the general prohibition against 
indiscriminate bombardment of civilian population centers than does the 
former's countercity philosophy Surely, the Reagan Administration 
apologists argue, it would be far better from a humanitarian, legal, 
moral, or ethical perspective to provide the President with such new 
weapons now, because they would enable him to fight a ’limited 
counterforce" instead of an 'all-out countercity" nuclear war Of course 
this entire line of argument assumes that what starts out as a 'limited 
counterforce" nuclear war would not ineluctably and quite rapidly escalate 
into an "all-out counteredty ' nuclear war Most civilian government 
officials and military experts believe to the contrarv There is no wav a
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counterforce nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union 
could be kept "limited " The general consensus of opinions held by 
responsible political and military leaders (as opposed to academic 
professionals or think-tank theorists) on both sides of the "balance of 
terror" is that a "limited" nuclear war cannot be fought without running 
an unacceptable risk of escalation into strategic nuclear warfare between 
the two superpowers***
Putting aside this inherent escalatory potential into nuclear 
Armageddon, we must directly address the question whether or not the 
Reagan Administration’s protracted nuclear war-prevailing" doctrine can 
be justified on the grounds that it is more lawful or at least less 
illegal than MAD or ’flexible response '* This argument seems to 
constitute the primary legal-moral-ethical justification propounded by the 
Reagan Administration for its alleged decision to formally* abandon mutual 
assured destruction" as the bedrock of American strategic nuclear 
deterrence theory, as well as to pursue its so-called ’strategic defense 
initiative' (SDI) of attempting to create a seemingly effective land-based 
and spaced-based defense for U S ICBM forces, hardened command centers, 
and maybe some civilian population concentrations against incoming Soviet 
nuclear warheads»*7 Hence determining the correct answer to this 
question goes to the very heart of the Reagan Administration s massive 
nuclear and conventional weapons buildup, together with its correlative 
lack of any genuine commitment to the negotiation of realistic nuclear 
arms control and reduction agreements with the Soviet Union a
The Theory Versus the Reality of U S Strategic Vuclear Deterrence
Although the above rationale might be the theory behind the 
Justification tor the Reagan Administration s de/elooment of a u 3
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pro trac ted nuclear war-prevailing capability, the practice of strategic 
nuclear deterrence is something totally different And although the 
theory might be superficially justifiable as an abstract proposition, such 
a justification becomes meaningless if the theory has little material 
bearing upon the actual practice of strategic nuclear deterrence 
Throughout any analysis of the legality or illegality of the threat to use 
nuclear weapons it becomes critical to distinguish between Ü S strategic 
nuclear deterrence doctrine m  theory and m  practice This distinction 
is important because there exists an enormous difference between the two 
Historically we have divided the evolutionary development of U S 
nuclear weapons deterrence theory into the periods of (1) massive 
retaliation; (2) mutual assured destruction, (3) flexible response, (4) 
the Schlesinger Doctrine, and (5) Presidential Directive 59 These were 
the theories that the United States government propounded m  public as to 
what motivated the planned use of its nuclear weaoons deterrence systems 
Yet the truth of the matter was that these theories were used essentially 
for two purposes either (1) to win election or re-election by certain 
presidential candidates, and/or (2) to justify the acquisition or 
non-acquisition of new nuclear weapon systems or conventional military 
forces, as well as the expenditure or non-expenditure of funds incidental 
thereto In essence these theories bore some relevance to the actual 
practice of U S nuclear weapons deterrence, but the theories were never 
determinative of the practices For the latter can only be found m  tie 
U S government s currently existing plans for the actual targeting of .ts 
strategic nuclear weapons forces
The actual practice of U S strategic nuclear weapons targeting 
consists of what is known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan
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(SIOP) 70 The SIOP contains the actual list of and priority among 
military, political, economic, and civilian targets in the Soviet Union 
that will be destroyed in the event of a nuclear war Very little if 
anything is revealed about the STOP m  the public record because its exact 
contents are highly classified As of today, however, we do know that the 
SIOP has supposedly gone through several distinct phases, m  theory at 
least along the lines of the evolution of the different stages outlined 
above.71
In fact, however, the general consensus seems to be that irrespective 
of any changes m  the publicly declared theory, what actually haopened was 
that as these theories were used to justify the acquisition of new nuclear 
weapons systems» more targets were simply added to the list 72 Since 
the United States now possesses approximately 10,000 strategic nuclear 
weapons designated for use on the Soviet heartland,73 it is probably the 
case that every Soviet city of even a minor size, every economic and 
industrial complex of even minor size, all military bases and 
installations, every airfield and even auxiliary airfields m  the Soviet 
Union, are currently listed on the SIOP for destruction m  a prearranged 
order of priority,74 with many targets scheduled to be destroyed several 
times over. And as the United States government moves forward to 
acquiring thousands of more nuclear weapons systems such as ground, aea 
and air launched cruise missiles, 31 and Stealth bombers, °ershmg 2s, the 
TO, Midgetman, and Trident 2, targets that are even more .nsigniricanc 
will simply be added to the SIOP
what is most likely to occur is that once the °~esxdent of the United 
States is given these new weapons systems, no alterat-on m  the SIOP will 
be made to reflect Reagan s allegedly more humanitarian theory of
"counterforce» nuclear targeting Rather, all that will probably happen 
is that the newer weapons systems will be assigned to destroy the higher 
priority targets, the older systems will be assigned to destroy lower 
priority targets, and some even more infinitesimally insignificant targets 
will be added to the bottom of the SIOP and targeted by the oldest 
systems So, although the Reagan Administration's "counterforce doctrine 
might at first blush appear to be somewhat justifiable m  an abstract and 
totally theoretical sense, the fact of the matter is that the doctrine 
will not be implemented in the practice of strategic nuclear targeting, 
which is all that really counts
The Counterproductivity of the Reagan Administration s SIOP
The highly classified nature of the SIOP does create a serious 
methodological problem for any study of the legality or illegality of 
strategic nuclear deterrence Vamely, we simoly do not have access to it 
and can only make our best estimate of what it might contain In an ideal 
situation we would be able to examine the records of the Joint Strategic 
Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) m  order to determine whether or not they 
have added, allocated, and prioritized targets for the SIOP m  accordance 
with any theory that takes into account considerations or international
7S To the contrary, this author suspects that most probably the 
SIOP is totally lawless and completely unjustifïable j.n accordance with 
any standard of international law, political and personal morality, or 
human sanity whatever the publiclv proclaimed theory as to the 
contemplated use of nuclear weapons And thi* has probaoly always been 
the case since at least the time of the Eisenhower Administration and
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îts doctrine of massive retaliation. A fortiori this would be especially 
true after the Reagan Administration has successfully deployed those 
strategic nuclear weapons systems such as the MX, Pershing 2, cruise 
missiles, and the Trident 2/Delta 5 that are supposedly designed for the
specific purpose of "prevailmg'* m  a "protracted" counterforce nuclear 
war
Indeed, it now seems to be the case that the Reagan Administration is 
spending its time, effort and excess of new nuclear weapons systems to 
select as additional targets for their current version of the SIOP 
semi-hardened or superficially-hardened bunkers that have been constructed 
for the Russian equivalent of Ü.S city councils for even very small towns 
m  tke Soviet Union T* The theory behind such ’elite" targeting is that 
the destruction of the entirety of the Soviet political leadership will 
prevent a reassertion of control over the domestic population m  a 
post-nuclear war era.T7 Of course this targeting rationale further 
assumes that there will exist civilian population concentrations of any 
significance m  the Soviet Union after a nuclear holocaust, which is 
highly unlikely Or to phrase this problem more concretely, m  the 
aftermath of a nuclear holocaust what political, military or economic 
difference will it make if the Soviet counterpart to the Mayor of Mattoon, 
Illinois (population 19,800) is alive or dead*
Even more problematically, however, if as the Reagan Administration 
apparently oelieves, the Soviet government is on the brink of political 
and economic collapse,7* it would make far more sense not to target 
anvwhere near many Soviet civilian population centers so that -n the e/ent 
of a general war the various national ethnic groups could rise up m  
revolution to overthrow their Great Russian oppressors This they did
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once before en masse during the First World War when the Tsarist Empire 
collapsed 79 And during the Second World War several ethnic groups such 
as the Ukrainians and Volga Germans proved completely unreliable 90 Why 
should the Reagan Administration target near civilian population centers 
m  these regions or m  Soviet Central Asia when their respective populaces 
are markedly hostile to the Great Russian administration of the Soviet 
empire m  the first place7
In the alternative, it has been reported that during the Carter 
Administration various government officials supervised the construction of 
a SIOP that incorporated, a philosophy of so-called ’counter—ethnic 
targeting’ with respect to the Soviet Union 91 In other words, major 
population centers inhabited primarily by the Great Russian people were 
selected for repeated and especially severe nuclear destruction because of 
their constituent ethnicity alone (Apparently Carter s national security 
adviser Zbigniew Brzezmski— an expatriate Pole— participated m  this 
enterprise with a great deal of fervor ) Whatever the alleged 
justification for this practice, all U S government officials wno were 
involved m  the nuclear targeting of ethnic groups as such actually 
committed the international crime of conspiracy to commit geroeide, as 
recognized by articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the U V Convention on the 
° revent ion and Punishment of the Crime of Genoc-.de (1948) 3 ‘ Ana to che 
extent that the Reagan Administration has merely continued to incorporate 
the Carter Administration s counter-ethnic targeting philosophy *n _ts 
version of the SIOP, all civilian and military government offxc^als who 
tenew or should have known about th.s oractics must assume *all personal 
responsibility under international law tor actually committing the crune 
of conspiracy to commit genocide 33 So much for the alleged legality ot
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the Reagan Administration's revised and improved rendition of Carter's 
Presidential Directive 59
A Preemptive Nuclear Strike Upon the Soviet Union
The Reagan Administration's counterargument m  support of the 
deployment of these offensive» first-strike counterforce strategic nuclear 
weapons systems such as the MX, Pershing 2, and Trident 2 is that the 
Soviet Union currently possesses the option to launch a surprise nuclear 
attack upon U S ICBM silos, and therefore that the United States must 
match the Soviet capability m  this regard 84 Despite the harrangue by 
the Committee on the Present Danger, however, and later under its 
influence by the Reagan Campaign and Administration, there is absolutely 
no indication that the Soviets have or will have the capability to launch 
a 'disarming' surprise first-strike upon U S ICBM silos 85 Even if the 
Soviets did, U S SLBM s and quick-alert bombers would still remain secure 
for the purpose of executing a retaliatory attack 86 The high 
probability of such an eventuality should be sufficient to deter anv tyoe 
of Soviet first-strike counterforce nuclear attack upon the United States 
But putting these technical arguments aside, it is crucial to address 
the legal, moral and philosophical dimensions of Reagan s argument m  
favor ot the U S government reciprocating some alleged Soviet capability 
to launch a surprise nuclear attack upon its adversary just because tie 
Soviet Union might scmedav decide to pursue a patently -Ilegal oolicy o. 
developing a first-strike counterforce strategic nuclear weapons 
capability provides absolutely no good reason why the U S government 
should automatically do the same The United States of America has to
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analyze the strategic nuclear equation m  light of both its own vital 
national interests and its own cherished national values In particular, 
America cannot abandon or pervert its national values simply because its 
adversary might not share them Likewise* America cannot ignore its vital 
national interest m  upholding the international legal order just because 
the Soviets might not share that same interest If America mimics the 
Soviets, then America gradually becomes like them and eventually becomes 
indistinguishable from them m  the eyes of our allies, neutrals, 
adversaries, and, most tragically of all, ourselves In other words, the 
United States government will become just as Machiavellian m  its conduct 
of both foreign affairs and domestic policy as the Soviets allegedly are, 
though this author does not subscribe to such a demonical interpretation 
of Soviet behavior.
Therefore, even if the Soviet Union sets out to develop an offensive 
first-strike counterforce strategic nuclear weapons capability against 
U S ICBM silos, that does not provide either a sufficient justification 
or a sound reason for the United States to do the same We must not 
imitate the Soviets under any circumstances They must not become the
ones who dictate our nuclear weapons policies to us. Indeed, if the SALT 
II Treaty had been ratified by the United States of America, as it has 
been by the Soviet Union,*7 there would exist no hypothetical rationale 
For either superpower to pursue the development of a fmst-str.ke 
counterforce strategic nuclear weapons capability The m a m  obstacle to 
the prevention of a first-strike nuclear arms race between the two 
superpowers nas proven to be the Reagan Administration s obstinate refusai 
to support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty because the latter is 
alleged to be ’fatally flawed* m  some mysterious manner 38 The time
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has long passed for the Reagan Administration to have abandoned the 
anti-Carter rhetoric of the Reagan Campaign
Nuclear Deterrence of Conventional Warfare
We must set aside all the exotic theories of strategic nuclear 
deterrence that have been developed by the United States government to 
start with the basic premise that m  accordance with the fundamental rules 
international law, the threat to use nuclear weapons can only be 
justified, if at all, our the grounds of legitimate self-defense as 
recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter But although the 
requirement of legitimate self-defense is a necessary precondition for the 
legality of any theory of nuclear deterrence, it is certainly not 
sufflcient the threat to use nuclear weapons must also take into
account the customary and conventional international laws of humanitarian 
armed conflict.
Professor Bums Weston at the University of Iowa College ot Law has 
usefully reduced the essence of the international laws or humanitarian 
armed conflict into six basic principles*89
Rule 1 It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause 
unnecessary or aggravated devastation and surfertig 
Rule 2 It is prombited to use weapons or tactics that cause 
indiscriminate oarm as between combatants and noncombatant 
military and civilian personnel
Rule 3 It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the naturai
environment
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Rule 4 It is prohibited to effect reprisals that are
disproportionate to their antecedent provocation or to legitimate
military objectives, or disrespectful of persons, institutions
and resources otherwise protected by the laws of war
Rule 5« It is prohibited to use weapons or tactics that violate
the neutral jurisdiction of nonparticipating States
Rule 6 It is prohibited to use asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, including
bacteriological methods of warfare
At first glance it would appear that the only type of threatened nuclear 
warfare now realistically contemplated by the United States government 
which might m  a totally theoretical sense be somewhat consistent with the 
criteria of international humanitarian law could possibly be a 
'battlefield nuclear war" m  Europe Certainly the most important of all 
circumstances under which the U S government forthrightly proclaims .ts 
near instantaneous readiness to use nuclear weapons concerns the 'defense ' 
of the NATO alliance It is long-standing American governmental policy 
that m  the event of a Soviet conventional attack upon bestem Europe, the 
United States is fully prepared to respond with nuclear weaDons, 
proceeamg, if necessary, up the ladder of escalation from battlefield 
nuclear weapons, to tactical nuclear weapons, to theater nuclear torces, 
and finally culminating wit^ a strategic nuclear attack oy the United 
States upon the Soviet Union itseif That is well-estabiisned American 
and NATO policy, but is it correct, efficacious, or even sensible7
An international legal analysis would say no because the respors-ve 
use of nuclear weapons to repel a conventional attacK would oe totailv 
disproportionate to the threat presented and therefore constitute an
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ìmpermissible act of self-defense 30 The counterargument that the use 
of U S. battlefield nuclear weapons stationed m  Europe would entail a 
roughly proportionate response to a Soviet conventional attack rests upon 
the basis of pure speculation, not established fact Putting aside their 
inherent escalatory potential into nuclear Armageddon, NATO has already 
determined that its battlefield nuclear weapons are essentially useless if 
not suicidally dangerous, because it has no idea about their precise 
yields, accuracy, survivability, or operational reliability under battle 
conditions 91 Once again, although m  theory the proposition that a 
"battlefield nuclear war is legal" might sound appealing, m  practice it 
fails to live up to its hypothetical expectations
This observation should lead the United States government to the 
conclusion that it is far better for NATO to phase out all of its 
battlefield, tactical and theater nuclear weapons systems from Europe as 
part of a negotiated process with the Soviet Union for doing the same, and 
build up, if necessary, U.S and NATO conventional forces to a level 
sufficient to deter any anticipated, though unlikely, Soviet conventional 
invasion of Europe A similar argument from a non-legal perspective has 
already been developed by such, a distinguished public figure as George 
Ball 92 iis analysis is fully supportable by basic principles of 
international law
The only minor point of contention this author might have concerning 
Ball’s position is that xt is not necessarily inevitable that tne United 
States would have to couple a negotiated denuclearization of Europe vith 
an enormous buildup m  NATO conventional forces Such Euro-nuclear 
negotiations could De tied into the Mutual and Balanced Torce Reduction 
(MBFR) negotiations, which, admittedly, are currently stalemated m
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Vienna.93 Yet in the proposals on the table so far* both sides are m  
basic agreement on the principle that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should each 
reduce to the identical level of 900,000 men, with no more than 700,000 
ground troops 94 The achievement of a rough equality m  conventional 
forces at such lower levels between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would 
materially reduce any incentive for the latter to launch a conventional 
attack while at the same time it would obviate the need for a massive 
buildup m  NATO's conventional forces. An effective conventional 
deterrent could be maintained at lower levels of potential violence on 
both sides of the "balance of terror" without the need for either to field 
a nuclear deterrent to a conventional attack
The exact differential m  the conventional force ratio between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact becomes even less important when it is realized that 
many of the latter s component forces are completely unreliable In the 
most improbable event the Soviets did decide to launch an offensive 
invasion of Western Europe," it is highly unlikely that the rational 
military forces of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania would 
fight by their side It is also open to considerable doubt whether or not 
the forces of East Germany would be prepared to invade West Germany at the 
behest of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the greatest deterrent to a Soviet 
invasion of Western Eurooe is this realization by the U S S R  s Great 
Russian governing elite that m  the event of outright military hostilities 
the armed forces of all these Warsaw Pact countries might verv well 
exploit the opportunity to rise up m  revolt against their respective 
Soviet occupying forces, thus effectively joining the struggle on NATO s 
side Furthermore, nominally Soviet cit.zens Living m  the Jkra_ne 
Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasus and Soviet Central
-53-
Asia might decide to do the exact same thing And the Red Army itself 
could then very well collapse when its non-Russian soldiers refuse to 
fight and die for their Soviet masters
The replication of this pattern of virulent nationalistic behavior 
during both the First and Second World Wars continues to serve as a 
sufficient deterrent to any Great Russian leadership elite giving serious 
contemplation to an invasion of Western Europe.** Indeed, this author 
submits that historically the primary deterrent to a Soviet invasion of 
Western Europe has always been its Great Russian elite’s acute anxiety 
engendered by the highly tenuous nature of the influence they exert over 
their so-called Warsaw Pact allies as well as over substantial segments of 
their own population Neither the IJ S strategic nuclear deterrent, nor 
the U S creation of a nuclear-trip wire for NATO by the stationing of 
350,000 American troops m  West Germany, nor the deployment of thousands 
of nuclear weapons m  NATO countries has contributed more than marginally 
to the effectiveness of this essentially self-induced perceptual deterrent 
Therefore it is totally misleading for Reagan Administration 
apologists to blithely assert that the peace of Europe has somehow been 
preserved for the past thirty years because ot the presence ot battlefield 
nuclear weapons on NATO territory *T Rather, the peace of EuroDe has 
somehow been miraculously maintained during this period despite the 
presence of thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides of the continent 
Yet the United States and NATO, on the one hand, ana the Soviet union and 
the Warsaw Pact, on the other, must not continue to relv upon providence 
to protect them from the outbreak of a battlefield or theater nuclear war 
.un Europe
In accordance with basic principles or international law, a 
conventional attack bv the Soviet Union and tne Warsaw Pact upon Western
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Europe should be resisted by NATO mounting a conventional defense Under 
such apocalyptic circumstances the only possible utility nuclear weapons 
might have is that the threat of their use could serve as a deterrent to 
their use by an adversary This situation would be similar to that which 
prevailed during the Second World War when it came to the non-use of 
chemical weapons and poison gas Pursuant to the Geneva Protocol of 1925»
neither set of belligerents used such weapons m  the European theater of 
operations» though each side maintained a stockpile m  order to deter 
their first-use by its adversaries ** The Geneva Protocol worked quite 
effectively to prevent the use of these early weapons of mass and 
indiscriminate destruction during the utter desperation of the Second 
world War despite the fact that their potency had been amply demonstrated 
during the First World War Conversely, just as the prior existence of 
these early weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction proved to be 
politically and militarily irrelevant to the outbreak of the Second World 
War, so too the existence of battlefield, tactical and theater nuclear 
weapons systems m  Europe will likewise demonstrate themselves to be 
immaterial to the successful or unsuccessful prevention of World War III 
Today the Soviet Union has already given a unilateral pledge of 
'no-first-use" of nuclear weapons that creates a binding international 
legal obligation on its own accord 99 NATO and the Inited States must 
respond m  kind by doing the same, 1,0 and then expressing their 
readiness to conclude a formal treaty to that eftect with the members of 
the Warsaw Pact Considerations ot international law would ful^v suooort 
such a "no-first-use treaty as a preliminary btep toward the comolete 
elimination of battlefield, tactical and theater nuclear weapons from cKe 
continent of Europe Yet, while tne Soviet Union has already agreed to
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conelude a no-first-use treaty, the Reagan Administration has rejected 
such a positive and worthwhile endeavor l®1
Is it Lawful to Possess Nuclear Weapons?
The final question that needs to be addressed concerning the relevance 
of international law to the so-called paradox of nuclear deterrence is 
whether or not it is lawful for a state even to possess nuclear weapons 
A great deal has been said about this subject on both sides of the 
dispute The author submits, however, that the question itself is 
completely speculative and misdirected, if not outrightly misleading It 
obfuscates the fact that today s acknowledged nuclear weapons states 
(viz , United States, Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, People s 
Republic of China) do not simply possess nuclear weapons Rather, they 
nave actively deployed nuclear weapons m  enormous numbers and varieties 
by attaching them to delivery vehicles that are -nterconnected with 
sophisticated command, control, communication and intelligence (C31) 
networks*1®2 Such nuclear weapons systems are ready for almost 
instantaneous launch upon immediate notice. Hence the only meaning!ul 
question concerns the legality of modern nuclear weapons systems as thev 
are currently deployed and programmed for use
If the nuclear weapons states had actually kept all their nuclear 
devices stored m  warehouses where they were separated Crcm their 
respective delivery vehicles, it might be oertment to answer the question 
wnether or not such mere possession of nuclear weapons was legal under 
international law Yet that historically has not been the case The 
nuclear weapons svsterns maintained by all the world s nuclear weapons
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states « and especially by the two superpowers, are far beyond this stage 
of mere possession, and have been at the point of deployment and 
preparation for immediate use in a thermonuclear war for quite some time 
As pointed out earlier m  this article, under the Nuremberg Principles, 
such planning, preparation and conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, inter alia, constitute 
international crimes in their own right
The appropriate analogy from domestic law to be applied here is not 
the hand gun kept in the bedroom bureau drawer for the purposes of 
legitimate self-defense against a home intruder But rather, a shotgun 
that is fully loaded and pointed at the head of another human being, with 
the safety catch off, the hammer cocked, the firing mechanism set on a 
hair-trigger, and the assailant s finger ready, willing and able to twitch 
at an instant s notice or even because of a mistake or an instinctual 
reflex* This is clearly illegal behavior under the domestic criminal 
legal system of any state m  the world community today, and therefore 
under international law as well, since it violates a general principle of 
law recognized by all civilized nations*103
In any jurisdiction within the United States of America, such criminal 
activity purposely and knowingly engaged m  oy two individuals with 
respect to each ocher would render both guilty of aggravated assault, 
assault with a deadly weapon, and reckless endangerment of a numan oemg, 
inter alia ^foreover, as would be true tor dueling, Russian Roulette, or 
olaymg chicken with automobiles, the fact that two or more individuals 
voluntarily participated in such a joint criminal enterprise would not 
excuse anyone from personal responsibility In the case of moaem nuclear 
weapons systems, the two nuclear superpowers have both committed and are
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continuing to commit on an everyday basis the international crime of 
recklessly endangering the entire human race They cannot exonerate 
themselves from joint and several criminal responsibility for such illegal 
behavior by invoking the unlawful conduct of their co-felons
So much then for the argument made by some international law 
professors that just because five states in today’s world comminity 
already possess and deploy nuclear weapons systems and several more are 
^^^‘18ently pursuing policies designed to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability, their behavior somehow negates the existence of international 
legal rules prohibiting the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons 
and related delivery and C*I systems 104 Since when have a small band 
of criminals been permitted to argue that their own lawless conduct 
destroys the validity of the very laws they have violated7 The maxim ex 
injuria non oritur jus is a general principle of law recognized by all 
civilized nations» and therefore a rule of international law as well 105 
The repeated commission of criminal acts by a few miscreant states 
cannot create a right for them to continue to do so unless, perhaps, the 
rest of the international community might agree to abrogate the aDplicable 
rules of law To the contrary, as of January 1, 1984 there were 124 state 
oarties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), article 2 of which prohibits non-nuclear weapons state oarties trom 
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability °* The fact that of the five 
acknowledged nuclear weapons states, only three (United States, Great 
Britain, Soviet Union) are parties to the NPT does not mean that the 
non-nuclear weapons state parties have thereby implicitly consented to the 
legality of their possession and deployment of nuclear weapons and related 
delivery and C3I systems Even if the NPT were to be abrogated bv the
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non-nuclear weapons state parties because the nuclear weapons state 
parties have already committed a material breach of the treaty by failing 
to perform their obligations under article 6,107 the possession and 
deployment of nuclear weapons and their related systems would still remain 
illegal because it violates the various rules of international law 
enumerated above
Indeed, any international agreement purporting to legalize the 
possession and deployment of nuclear weapons and their related systems 
would violate a peremptory norm of international law and thus be void m  
accordance with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 10* If piracy, slavery, armed aggression, crimes against 
peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide are universally 
considered to violate jus cogens» then a fortiori the threat by the two 
nuclear superpowers to exterminate the entire numan race, coupled with 
their imminent capability to do so, must likewise do the same 
International law professors must face up to the fact that for them to 
argue that the present system or nuclear deterrence as practiced by the 
two superpowers and their nuclear cohorts is lawful, they must m  essence 
deny the very existence of such a phenomenon known m  the international 
legal studies profession as a peremptory norm of international ¿aw This 
author seriously doubts that such would be the .ntencion of even those vho 
are most fervently committed to promoting the abstract proposition that 
nuclear deterrence is legal
CiVil Disobedience m  a Thermonuclear Age
It is clear beyond a reasonaDle doubt that nuclear deterrence as 
currently oracticed by today s acknowledged nuclear weapons states, and
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especially by the two nuclear superpowers, is egregiously illegal under 
international law Yet it is quite another matter to get this egregious 
lawlessness of modern nuclear deterrence introduced into evidence before a 
jury m  a criminal trial for the purpose of defending those prosecuted for 
acts of alleged civil disobedience directed against the U S nuclear 
weapons establishment In order to be admitted into evidence, the 
international legal considerations must be related to the traditional 
common law and statutory defenses generally available within the 
particular jurisdiction for ordinary crimes
These defenses include but are not limited to the defense of self, 
defense of others, defense of property, duress, compulsion, necessity, 
choice of evils, prevention of a crime, prevention of a public 
catastrophe, mistake of fact or law, etc Vo point would be served here 
by producing an extended analysis of how international legal 
considerations should be related to these traditional criminal law 
defenses, since the precise elements of each defense would depend upon the 
relevant state or federal law under which the defendants are prosecuted 
Trial attorneys representing anti-nuclear protesters are well advised to 
make a detailed and comprehensive analysis of all statutory and common law 
defenses generally available to defendants m  criminal orosecutions within 
their respective jurisdictions before they consult an international law 
professor to determine how considerations of international law, including 
his testimony as an expert witness at trial, can oe related to these 
traditional defenses Without the careful establishment of this 
interconnection before trial, the odds are fairly good that the judge will 
never allow the international legal considerations to be brought to tue 
attention of the jury since the proper evidentiarv foundation will not 
have been laid for their admission
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rn order to better relate these traditional criminal defenses to 
international law, the trial attorney should point out to the judge that 
U s domestic law has expressly incorporated international law by means of 
article VI of the U S Constitution with respect to treaties10* and 
other international agreements,110 as well as by the famous decision of 
the United States Supreme Court m  Paquete Sabana. 175 U S 677 (1900), 
with respect to customary international law 11 Defense counsel should 
argue that since customary international law is a part of both federal and 
state common law, federal or state criminal statutes should not be 
construed in a manner that would be inconsistent with the requirements of 
international law Similarly, counsel can also argue that international 
treaties and agreements should be accorded the benefit of the Supremacy 
Clause with respect to state criminal law statutes, or of the rule ’last 
m  time prevails” with respect to federal criminal statutes 112 Counsel 
should prepare and suomit jury instructions to the judge along these lines 
As a general rule, the aforementioned criminal law defenses are what 
professors of criminal law call "affirmative defenses ’ According to the 
holding of the United States Supreme Court m  Patterson v New York. 432 
U S 197 (1977), it would be constitutionally permissible for a state to 
put the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish by a fair 
preoonderance of the evidence that he is entitled to cia-m the benent ot 
such affirmative defenses,113 though, to be sure, not all jurisdictions 
do so 114 Nevertheless, there is at least one line or defense that 
should be available m  many jurisdictions that would not be subject to 
this debilitating condition cor allocating the burden of proof to the 
defendant Many anti-nuclear protesters seem to nave been charged with 
crimes that criminal law protessors denominate soecific intent crimes
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That is» in addition to the general mens rea requirement that the 
defendant acted intentionally, these criminal statutes oftentimes require 
an additional mental element for example, that the defendant also acted 
knowingly, willfully, maliciously, or for an unlawful purpose A trial 
attorney would be well advised to establish whether or not any of the 
crimes for which his anti-nuclear client has been charged are specific 
intent crimes, and if the matter has not yet been authoritatively 
determined, to litigate that issue before trial.
According to the holding of the United States Supreme Court m  
giulianey v Wilbur. 421 U S. 684 (1975), the state has the burden of proof 
respect to establishing the existence of all elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt lls In the case of a specific intent crime, 
this would include the need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only 
general mens rea but also the specific intent element necessary to 
constitute the crime. For example, m  a prosecution for the crime of 
trespass for an unlawful purpose, the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt not only that the defendant intentionally trespassed, but also that 
he did so for an unlawful puroose
All that would be required is for the anti-nuclear protester to 
testify that he generally believed something known as international iaw, 
or the Nuremberg Principles, or the Genocide Convention, or the Geneva 
Conventions, or the Hague Regulations, or the U N Charter, or the u N 
General Assembly etc prohibited the threat or use of nuclear weapons and 
therefore that he was acting m  accordance with the requirements of 
international law Defense counsel should then argue that although his 
anti-nuclear client might have intentionally trespassed, ne/ertheless he 
did not do so for an unlawful purpose Instead his client oelieved he was
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acting for the purpose of upholding the requirements of both international 
law and U S domestic lav
This argument would then provide the basis upon which the testimony of 
an expert witness on international law could be introduced into evidence 
for consideration by the jury The expert’s testimony as to the complete 
illegality of nuclear deterrence under international law would be relevant 
to the question of the defendant’s specific intent— m  this case 
establishing the lawfulness or not of the purpose for which he 
intentionally trespassed The testimony of the expert witness should be 
admitted for the purpose of corroborating the defendant’s belief as to the 
requirements of international law If not, the trial attorney should make 
an offer of proof to this effect so that the issue would be preserved for 
appeal
This litigation strategy would be analogous to criminal trials m  
which psychiatrists have been permitted to testify as to the defendant s 
mental condition m  so-called ^diminished capacity” defenses As a 
criminal defense, diminished capacity was historically derived from the 
common law defense of voluntary intoxication,118 which, although not 
traditionally recognized as a defense to general mens rea crimes, was 
nevertheless permitted as a defense to negate a specific intent element m  
a specific intent crime llT For example, m  the case of common law 
larceny a defendant who was voluntarily intoxicated was nevertheless 
permitted to argue to the jury that he was so intoxicated that he could 
not have formulated an intention to permanently deprive the owner of t^e 
property at the time of the theft 18
This rationale was su dsequent1/ extenaed to permit criminal defendants 
to argue that although their mental incapacity, disease or defect was not
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subs tant ïal enough to fulfill the requirements for the legal definition of 
insanity recognized m  their jurisdiction and thus to negate general mens 
rea* nevertheless expert psychiatric testimony about their mental 
condition could be admitted and considered by the jury with respect to the 
issue of whether or not it negated the existence of a specific intent 
element necessary to constitute the crime 110 For example, although a 
defense of diminished capacity would not generally be permitted to negate 
malice aforethought and thereby reduce second degree murder to 
manslaughter, it would be sufficient to negate ’premeditation and 
deliberation” and thus reduce a first degree murder charge to second 
degree murder*120 Expert psychiatric testimony would be admissible on 
the question of whether or not the defendant possessed the necessary 
mental capacity to premeditate and deliberate, and the burden of proof 
would then be upon the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant had actually premeditated and deliberated before he 
committed the murder
If the judge allows the international legal considerations to go to 
the jury with respect to the question of whether or not the anti-nuclear 
protester actually possessed the soecific intent element necessary to 
constitute the crime, defense counsel can then always argue chat the 
government has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted with the specific intent required because of tus 
reasonable belief that both international law and C S domestic law 
orohioited the planning, preparation, and conspiracy to commit crimes 
against peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions etc that are so intrinsic to modem 
nuclear deterrence Depending on the quality or defense counsel, the
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expert witness» and the trial judge» the anti—nuclear protester might 
stand a good chance of obtaining an acquittal or at least a hung jury 
Whatever litigation strategy is eventually adopted» the defense of 
anti-nuclear protesters under international law requires a skilled trial 
attorney working from the very outset of the case with an expert on 
international law to lay the foundation for getting the international 
legal considerations submitted into evidence before the jury 
Consequently» anti-nuclear protesters must be told that if they wish to 
properly raise considerations of international law during the trial, they 
must allow themselves to be represented by an attorney It will be 
difficult enough for that attorney to convince the judge to allow the 
international law considerations to be submitted to the jury m  the first 
place, and, given the technical rules of evidence, it would be almost 
impossible for a non-lawyer to lay the proper foundation for the 
admissibility of the international law expert s testimony This factor
strongly suggests that anti-nuclear protesters set aside what might be
\
their own preferences to represent themselves Instead, they must 
subordinate their personal wishes to the higher good by allowing their 
defense to be conducted by a trial attorney with the assistance of an 
international law expert.
The conscientious and systematic pursuit of such tr^al strategies by 
members of all three groups— lawyers, experts, and orotesters— working 
together could eventually result m  a series of acquittals or hong juries 
in anti-nuclear protest cases. If properly publicized, each such 
acquittal or hung jury will encourage other private citizens to engage in 
similar civil disobedience activities In the case of an acquittal, a 
jurv of their peers would have already determined that such action is
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definitely not criminal behavior* but rather perfectly lawful conduct In 
the case of a hung jury, the presumption of innocence with respect to such 
activities would still remain undisturbed* Furthermore, a series of such 
acquittals or hung juries m  anti-nuclear protest cases will send a strong 
message to those m  power that the ordinary people of America who comprise 
juries will no longer tolerate their government's pursuit of patently 
illegal nuclear deterrence policies that threaten the extinction of the 
human species. Only then can we expect fundamental changes m  the nature 
of the thermonuclear predicament that confronts humankind today
Conclusion
From a functionalist perspective, several points become clear 
concerning the relevance of international law to the so-called paradox 
of nuclear deterrence First* a surprise* preemptive nuclear strike by 
the United States upon the Soviet Union is absolutely prohibited for any 
reason whatsoever Consequently* all first-strike counterforce strategic 
nuclear weapons systems such as the MX, Pershing 2, and Trident 2/Delta 5 
warhead must not be deployed, and the United States should seek to obtain 
a mutual and negotiated ban on the deployment of their Soviet 
counterparts This development would facilitate the conclusion of a 
formal international agreement prohibiting the adoption of a 
launch-on-warnmg’ nuclear response doctrine by either the Soviet Onion 
or the United States Pursuant thereto, all f-rst—str-ke contingency 
scenarios should be removed from U S war-plans, and Congress should pass 
implementing legislation making it a serious federal crime for U S 
government officials and military officers to practice first-strike 
scenarios during war games or otherwise
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Second, a ü S  nuclear attack upon Soviet population centers is 
absolutely prohibited under all circumstances, and even if undertaken m  
retaliation for a prior nuclear attack against U S population centers 
Consequently, the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" must be 
abandoned as the cornerstone of American strategic nuclear deterrence 
policy Nevertheless, the Reagan administration's plan to substitute for 
it the development of a "protracted nuclear war-prevailing" capability is 
not the proper direction in which to move. Rather, the correct approach 
is prescribed by article 6 of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which both the United States and the Soviet Union 
are bound to obey as parties "Each of the Parties to the Treaty 
undertakes to pursue negotiations m  good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control "l21
Hence, the United States government must m  good faith negotiate 
genuine and effective nuclear arms control and reduction agreements with 
the Soviet Union that likewise prevent the modern-ration of both 
superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals Ultimately, the formal 
ratification of SALT II or of some cosmetic substitute by the United 
States government will prove to be the necessary precondition for any 
progress m  negotiating nuclear arms reduction agreements with the Soviet 
Union Strategic arms reduction talks (START) can only succeed within the 
context of a ratified SALT II The essence of a START agreement can still 
be ootamed if the United States government ratines the SALT II Treaty, 
then both superpowers agree to lower its numerical limitations on 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle launchers, and then to extend
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ìndefinitely the life of such a ratified Treaty as so amended At that 
point further percentage reductions m  the SALT II limitations could be 
negotiated on a periodic basis» while both superpowers would declare and 
observe a bilateral moratorium on the modernization of their strategic 
nuclear weapons systems
In the meantime» while moving toward the goals set forth in NPT 
article 6» the d m  ted States government must announce that m  the event of 
a nuclear or conventional attack upon the United States or the members of 
the NATO alliance by the Soviet Union» America would not under any 
circumstances actually use its nuclear weapons against Soviet population 
centers as such The United States should seek a reciprocal statement 
from the Soviet Union along those lines, and offer to conclude a formal 
treaty specifically prohibiting both a nuclear attack upon, as well as the 
strategic nuclear targeting of, their respective civilian population 
centers as such. International lawyers working for the Departments of 
Defense, State, and Justice oiust be given the authority to vet the SIOP m  
accordance with these and all other requirements of international law 122 
Finally, since nuclear weapons must never be used m  response to a 
conventional attack, NATO should adopt a f,no—first—use** of nuclear weapons 
policy for the defense of Europe and agree to conclude a treaty to that 
with the Warsaw Pact NATO and the Warsaw Pact should commence 
immediate negotiations for the removal of all battlefield, tactical, and 
theater nuclear weapon systems from the continent of Europe And the MBFR 
negotiations at Vienna should be revitalized m  order to orevent a massive 
buildup m  conventional military forces on either side of the continent
* * *
This author once received an unsolicited telephone call from a woman 
who, m  a self-deprecating tone of voice, identified herself as an
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ordinary middle-class* middle-aged housewife living m  a suburb near 
Denver, Colorado, and wanting to discuss the following matter She and a 
group of friends had an appointment m  a few days with the Director of the 
Rocky Mountain Nuclear Arsenal, and at that time they planned to place him 
tmd®r citizen s arrest in his own office for the commission of crimes 
against international law' Unless and until the ordinary people of 
America rise up to challenge the elemental lawlessness of modern nuclear 
deterrence, the future of the human race will be determined by the 
Machiavellians of the U S* nuclear priesthood who occupy positions of 
power and influence in America s government, its sycophantic think-tanks, 
and its prostituted universities» We must mobilize the common people to 
save humanity from these self-styled experts
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